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Abstract
This paper investigates how labour supply trends might have a®ected the
OECD labour markets in the last decades. It is argued that changes in supply
cannot be considered as homogenous: they involve more young and more adult
female workers, who are complements with skilled men and substitutes with
low-wage groups (young, unskilled). Such labour supply trends since the 50's
may have increased competition between women, young workers and low skilled
workers in some segments of the labour force. These mechanisms are described
by a model and an empirical strategy is undertaken to test its predictions.
Disaggregation by gender is necessary. Endogeneity of participation levels with
respect to unemployment is treated in two ways, by instrumental variables
estimators, and with time series techniques. Signi¯cant causal relations between
participation and unemployment cannot be rejected.
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2'Ask ¯ve economists and you'll get ¯ve di®erent answers (six if one went to Har-
vard).' Edgar R. Fiedler
In the last twenty years, a large number of possible causes of rising European
unemployment have been put forward, without any consensus. Recently, a new line
of explanation has emerged1. Starting from the observation that wage earnings in-
equality has increased considerably over the past 25 years in the US and in the UK,
but has remained fairly stable in the high unemployment countries, it postulates
that a common cause could explain the two phenomena, unemployment and inequal-
ity. The evolution of wage inequality was studied for example in Davis (1992), Katz
and Murphy (1992), Katz, Loveman and Blanch°ower (1993), Juhn, Murphy and
Pierce (1993), Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1995), Goux and Maurin (1995). The
forces involved in the increase in inequality (mainly in the literature biased techni-
cal progress, or international trade with less success), could well be the same across
countries, but act di®erently due to the country-speci¯c institutions. Any institu-
tional factor leading to wage rigidity at the bottom of distribution might explain the
di®erences between the US and Europe (minimum wage, unions, non-wage income
or unemployment bene¯ts causing increasing reservation wages).
In this paper, I will follow this appealing line of explanation, which seems to rule
out the usual distinction between the factors of increase in unemployment on the one
hand, and the factors of persistence of unemployment on the other hand2. However,
being not entirely convinced by theories which only rely on technological changes
a®ecting the demand for labour (after all, these changes come often as residuals, i.e.
what has not been explained by other factors), I will rather focus on the changes in
labour supply which, in contrast, have the advantage that they can be observed and
quanti¯ed. In this paper, both the increase and the persistence in unemployment
will be interpreted as the consequence of a positive link with labour supply, which
itself shows a huge degree of persistence.
It should be recalled, however, that any attempt to link labour supply and unem-
ployment will face an immediate and strong objection; all evidence suggests that, in
a constant return to scale world, a homogeneous increase in the level of the labour
1from Harvard and around.
2This distinction has been a key ingredient of other explanations (e.g. see Bean 1994, Blanchard
and Summers 1986, Bruno and Sachs 1985).
3force should be neutral on labour markets in the long-run. From an empirical per-
spective, it is usually claimed that over a period of one century, the population
has constantly grown but without creating a trend in unemployment (Layard et al.,
1991). This is due to the fact that the capital stock increases so that the capital
per unit of labour is constant and maintains real wages constant ceteris paribus, i.e.
in absence of technological progress. This is the conventional Solowian view which
is also applied to labour markets with equilibrium unemployment in representative
agents' frameworks, in Nickell (1991).
Departing from this homogeneity of labour supply and allowing for generation
e®ects as in Pissarides (1989) or in Welch (1979), labour supply is no longer neutral.
My starting point here will be that the increase in the level of the labour force of
the postwar period is absolutely unique in history because it involves more married
women and in the 70's, more young workers of the baby-boom cohorts, thus increasing
the share of unattached and inexperienced workers in the labour markets of almost
all OECD countries. Then, in accordance with the ¯rst point, my second point is
that the aggregate level of participation is not the correct variable to explaining
unemployment, one should rather consider the composition of the labour force3.
Section 1 presents eight stylized facts on the labour market with a focus on gender
and age. The main point is that women and young are similar in many dimensions
(unemployment, participation, substitutability in production). Their wage evolutions
however diverge: the relative wages of women tend to slowly increase, whereas the
relative wages of young workers have declined in the last decades. Section 2 intro-
duces a model of demand and supply of labour which accounts for all these facts. The
labour market is modelled with two segments, a primary and a secondary segment,
which also represent two di®erent occupations, a high wage and a low wage occu-
pation. Wages are competitive in the primary segment and rigid in the secondary
segment. Workers in the primary segment are considered to be those with high ex-
3This is a new explanation for the trends in labour markets: the systematic study of the role
of supply factors seems absent from the literature, despite a seemingly strong explanatory power.
For instance, Katz and Murphy (1992) ¯nd that 83% of the increased return to experience for male
workers observed in the US, was due to the relative supply component. But they attribute this to
the supply of young workers, and do not control for the relative female labour supply, the evolution
of which is comparable to the supply of young workers in the 70's. In other papers, the role of
supply is only mentioned, never developed (Malinvaud 1986, Murphy and Topel 1987)
4perience and labour force attachment, while the workers in the secondary segments
are considered to be those with low experience and a higher propensity to quit or
leave the labour force. For simplicity, labour supply of adult men and young work-
ers is inelastic, in the primary and the secondary segments respectively, and adult
women's participation is driven by a neoclassical supply function of the expected
wages in each occupation and of the return to domestic activity. Thus the choice of
occupation for women is endogeneous. The model predicts two-ways links between
the composition of the labour force and unemployment. Section 3 derives an empir-
ical strategy to test those links in cross-section. Time series evidence is provided in
section 4. In both approaches, I attempt to underline a causality from participation
to unemployment but also from unemployment to participation. In the concluding
section, after discussing positive objections, I answer a potential normative misinter-
pretation about the implications of links between labour supply and unemployment:
in this paper, the positive link between female participation and unemployment is
simply a negative consequence of women's participation in low wage segments (Topel
1994a remarks that in the US, the median wage of women corresponds to the 25th
percentile of male wage distribution), which pleads in favour of less gender inequality,
not of lower female participation.
1 Female and young workers: similarities and di®erences
1.1 Cross-country correlations of unemployment by group
One point not emphasized earlier is that the countries with high female unemploy-
ment are also countries with high unemployment among the young. This can be
shown with the correlation coe±cients in 1992 across the OECD countries between
the prime-age (over 25) men unemployment rates, prime-age women unemployment
rates and youths' (under 25) unemployment rates (UMO, UF O and UY ):
UMO UF O UY
UMO 1 0.57 0.57
UF O 1 0.78
UY 1
Taking the average over the 1980-94 period to get rid of the transitory shocks
5yields the following higher correlation coe±cients:
UMO UF O UY
UMO 1 0.69 0.56
UF O 1 0.84
UY 1
At least, theories of unemployment should account for these correlations, to which
there is no straightforward answer. The goal of this paper is to provide an explanation
and to test it.
Fact 1: The correlation coe±cients between prime-age women and youth unem-
ployment are very strong (about 0.8 or more), and higher than the other correlations
between groups of the labour force.
1.2 Time-series evolution of unemployment by gender and age
The time series evolution of unemployment also reveals interesting features. It is
shown here that in the 80's unemployment in Europe is higher than in the US mainly
due to female unemployment4. The two top charts of ¯gure 1 display the rate of
unemployment by gender in the four Scandinavian countries (SCA), in the USA, in
Japan, and in 11 European countries (EU11) (excluding Greece). One can easily
recognize a regular and smooth pattern of European unemployment for both series,
as well as the strongly cyclical pattern of American unemployment rates and the very
low level of Japanese and Scandinavian (before 1991) rates. The striking feature is
the strong di®erence between US and European female unemployment rates, which
are a contrast to the relatively small di®erence in the corresponding rates for men.
In 1990, the gap is about 6 points for women, and about 2 points for men. The same
pattern is valid for ¯ve selected European countries (EU5): Spain, Italy, France,
Belgium and Germany. The gap between the USA and Europe is still 2 points for
men, but 9 points for women. This is also valid workers aged over 25: the two
4Since the di®erence between "unemployed" and "not in the labour force" might be narrow for
women, all rates here will correspond to the ILO de¯nition (the unemployed are those available for
a job and actively looking for one). See also Sorrentino (1993 and 1995) for a broader de¯nition of
unemployment including part-time workers looking for full-time jobs and discouraged workers; the
ranking of OECD countries for female unemployment remains unchanged with a notable exception:
Japan.
6bottom charts of ¯gure 1 plots the unemployment rates of the workers over 25, thus
excluding the young workers for whom the unemployment rate is higher in Europe.
Unemployment rates for prime-age men are similar in Europe and in the USA around
a 6% average, with fewer high frequency °uctuations in Europe . For this category of
workers, the unemployment problem does not exist more than in America - at least
considering the stocks. In contrast, unemployment rates for women are much higher
in Europe after 1983, with a 5% to 7% di®erence, compared to the USA.
Finally, European and the US unemployment rates also di®er due to workers
aged under 25. As can be seen in ¯gure 2, the only country in Europe in the 80's
with a lower unemployment rate than the US is Germany, whereas young workers in
Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands (HOL on the graph during most
of the 80's) face extremely high unemployment rates. See Blanch°ower (1996) for a
comprehensive discussion of the position of young workers in 23 countries.
Fact 2: Adult male unemployment rates are similar in Europe and in the US.
Fact 3: The unemployment rates of young and adult female workers are much
higher in Europe than in the US.
1.3 Substitutability in production
Another similarity between young workers and women is their substitutability in pro-
duction. Grant and Hamermesh (1979, 1982) estimated the elasticity of complemen-
tarity from a translog production function between physical capital, adult (aged over
25) men, adult women and young workers. They found capital to be q-complements
with all workers, men to be q-complements with women and young workers whereas
women and young workers are q-substitutes. At given input prices, it means that an
increase in the number of women in the labour force should lead to a decrease of the
equilibrium wage of young workers. The change in relative wages of young workers
will be even more important as they are substitutes for women and this can even
lead in some cases to a decrease in real wages. Indeed, the cross wage elasticity of
one group to the supply of another group is the share of this group in total costs
times the elasticity of complementarity, if we assume a constant supply of the other
factors (see Hamermesh 1986). Grant and Hamermesh estimated this elasticity to
be -0.15 between young and old white women. Berger (1983), estimating the same
translog function for the inputs capital, females workers and male workers disaggre-
7gated into four categories (skilled i.e. college and experienced, unskilled i.e. high
school and experienced, skilled and inexperienced and unskilled and inexperienced),
found female workers to be q-substitutes with low-experience (young) male workers,
slightly more with high-school than with college and also q-substitutes though to a
lesser extent with experienced male workers. Young educated workers are found to
be complements with older educated workers. Finally, Topel (1994b) compared the
e®ects on regional labour markets' wage inequalities of the increased participation of
women with alternative explanations such as technical changes and changes in the
industrial composition of labour demand. Estimating a demand-factors function, he
again found low-skilled women to be very q-substitutes with low-skilled men. His
conclusion is that \there is no evidence that di®erent regional evolutions of wages
are demand-driven; the whole story is on the supply side.\ In another paper, he
even wrote that \if women's participation had not changed, there would have been no
decline in the relative wages of less skilled men.\ (Topel, 1994a)
Fact 4: Women and young workers, more generally low-wage groups, are substi-
tutes for each other.
1.4 Shares in the labour force
Both groups (young and female workers) have represented an increasing share in the
labour force. This is obvious for women looking at ¯gure 3. Women participate
to a greater extent in every country. Despite some cross-country di®erences in the
participation rates, not reported here, the evolution of the share of women in the
labour force is very similar within the OECD, since countries with relatively lower
female participation also have lower male participation (due to country speci¯c early
retirement, schooling and training schemes).
The fact is less known when it comes to the young workers. Figure 4 top chart
reports the share of 25-34 years old in the labour force for the US and three groups
of European countries (Northern, Western and Southern Europe). Everywhere, the
share of young workers in the labour force is higher in the 80's than in the 60's,
with the strongest increase taking place in the 70's, i.e. the waves of the baby boom-
cohorts. Two misunderstandings must be avoided here. First, even though the
average age of the total population is higher, the labour force becomes younger:
older workers leave the labour market earlier, as indicated in ¯gure 4, bottom chart.
8Second, the size of the cohorts in the US peaked in 1977 and then decreased (see
Welch 1979), but the share of young workers reported here is a "stock", not a °ow.
Fact 5: Female participation has increased in all OECD countries, with some
di®erences in the levels of participation across countries. The labour force is also
younger in the 80's than in the 60's.
1.5 Wages
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of unconditional relative wages between the di®erent
categories of workers in the USA from 1967 to 19885: wf=wm is the ratio of female
to male median weekly earnings of US full-time workers, wy=wo is the ratio of young
people (under 25) to old (over 25). Finally, wf=wm(y) denotes the female to male
ratio for young workers, and wy=wo(m) denotes the ratio of young to old for male
workers, etc... It clearly appears, as reported in Katz and Murphy (1992) for instance,
that the gender earning gap decreased6, but mainly after 1977 and especially for
young workers. Before 1977, the relative wages appear to be fairly constant. In
contrast with women, the wages of young workers relative to older workers dropped,
from 0.95 to 0.75 for women and from 0.75 to 0.55 for men which needs not to be
explained.
Fact 6: In the US, the relative wages of women remained stable until 1977 and
have increased since then.
Fact 7: In the US, the relative wages of young workers have fallen since 1969.
However, if the wages of young and female workers evolves di®erently, the groups
still have a very similar position in the wage distribution. As already discussed in
introduction, Topel (1994a) reports that the median wage of women is equal to the
wage of the 25th percentile of male workers. The relative positions of young, of adult
men and adult women in the wage distribution present the same characteristics in a
country with a di®erent wage structure, such as France for example. For instance, if
one considers the share of employees paid the minimum wage, as reported in table
1, this share is much higher for adult women and young workers (17.7% and 17.5%
are paid the minimum wage) than for adult men (6.8%).
5Source: CPS, published data.
6This increase in relative wages is also valid before controlling for observable factors (see O'Neill
1985, for instance). Since the main topic of this paper is not wages but rather unemployment, I
give no further details.
91.6 Occupational choices for women
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the increasing quality of female participation
might explain part of the increase in female relative wages7. The number of women
in "low" occupations increased in absolute terms in the last decades, however. These
two points are illustrated in table 2. In the USA, the number of women in the labour
force increased strongly, millions switched from inactivity to employment. Their share
in the total labour force grew from 32.5% in 1960 to 45.4% in 1991. Now taking the
occupations 1+2 as a proxy for the good jobs, it appears that the average quality of
occupations held by women improved. In 1960, the share of women in these good
occupations relative to their total participation was 17.5%, thus less than the total
share of these jobs in employment (20.2%). This is one face of gender inequality be-
tween occupations. In 1991, the entire di®erence had disappeared: these occupations
constituted 29.2% of the occupations in the economy, while 29.6% of active women
were working in these occupations. But if the share of women in good occupations in-
creased, the supply of labour of women in the other (lower) occupations also increased
strongly, from 22.2 millions to 39.5 millions between 1970 and 1991, which possibly
increased the competition for these low skill jobs. A comparison with all other Euro-
pean countries would be fastidious, but the same ¯gures (not reported here) indicate
that the extent of the gender catch-up in occupations is lower, especially in Southern
Europe.
Fact 8: Women participate in better jobs/segments of the labour force.
2 A model
2.1 Workers
Understanding these facts requires a model in which labour supply is heterogeneous.
A simple model of a dual labour market will give the intuitions of the impact of a
compositional change of the labour force. Hereafter, I will use the words segments,
occupations and jobs without distinctions. The experienced, more productive and
stable workers are in the primary segment, and the inexperienced and less stable ones
are in the other segment, as in Doeringer and Piore (1971). To simplify, prime-age
7As is also suggested in Abowd et al. (1998), where the change in the distribution of workers'
unobserved skills accounts for the decrease of the gender gap in France.
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men (over 25) are all assumed to be in the primary segment8, women are assumed to
be work in one segment or another in proportion determined in equilibrium, and the
young workers are in the secondary segment9. In addition, it is assumed that there
is no unemployment in the primary segment and that there may be some "classical"
unemployment in the secondary segment, if the marginal productivity of secondary
workers is too low.
The following production function has the properties described in section 1.3, in
the simple case where the elasticity of complementarity is constant:
Y (G; B) = Y (LM ; LF1 ; LF2 ; LY ) = A:[(LM + LF1)
¹ + µ:(LF2 + LY )
¹]1=¹ (1)
where LM , LF1 , LF2 and LY are the equilibrium employment levels of men, women
in good (1) and bad (2) jobs and young workers. Factors µ and A are productivity
parameters and ¹ · 1 characterizes the substitutability between the two types of
jobs, with 1 ¡ ¹ the elasticity of complementarity.
2.2 Labour demand and wage determination
Assuming: fully °exible wages; that the number of adult of both genders is the
same; that all men participate in the labour force; that a fraction p of adult women
participate with p equal to LF =LM (LF = LF1 + LF2); that q is the (endogeneous)
share of women willing to work in primary jobs, equal to LF1=LF ; and that j the
(exogeneous) ratio of young to adult male workers equals LY =LM ; then the ¯rst order
conditions on employment yields:
w1
w2
=
1
µ
:
µ
LM + LF1
LF2 + LY
¶¹¡1
=
1
µ
:
µ
1 + q:p
(1 ¡ q):p + j
¶¹¡1
(2)
The ratio w1w2 depends on the relative quantity of primary and secondary workers. It
is clearly increasing in the share of young workers j, since ¹ ¡ 1 < 0: The changes of
relative wages can be divided into four parts :
d: ln(w1=w2) = ¡dµ=µ+
1¡¹
(1+p:q):[p:(1¡q)+j] : f[1 ¡ q(1 + j)]:dp ¡ (1 + j + p):p:dq + (1 + q:p)djg
(3)
8The assumption that all men are in the primary jobs is not at all essential. One could easily
extend the model to skilled and unskilled workers, the former working in the segment with rigid
wages, but that would be at the cost of obscuring the main message.
9See Blanchard and Diamond (1990a) for such a view of primary and secondary markets.
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Then w1w2 is decreasing with µ, q, and increasing with j and the participation rate p
if, and only if, q is smaller than 1=(1+j). Higher inequality measured by the relative
evolution of primary over secondary worker's wages may be the result of a demand
shift (the ¯rst term of the right hand side), or an increase in female participation
p not compensated by a su±cient increase in the quality of jobs dq. The average
wage of adult women is wf = q:w1 + (1 ¡ q):w2 and the gender wage gap is equal to
wf=wm = wf=w1 = q +(1 ¡q):w2=w1. The variations in the relative wages of female
workers is:
d[wf=wm] = dq(1 ¡ w2=w1) + (1 ¡ q)d(w2=w1) (4)
The ¯rst part, with dq > 0, is positive, the second will be negative if the adverse
impact of higher p dominates in equation (3). This means that one can observe
both an increase in female relative wages, an increase in female participation and
a decrease in w2=w1: when dq > 0and d(w2=w1) < 0, at least if dq dominates in
equation (4) i.e. when q is su±ciently close to 1.
Assume now a °oor on wages w which is indexed on the wage of primary workers
and let ° be the indexation rate, i.e. w= °:w1 = w2.10 The equilibrium is determined
in the following way. Employment in the good occupation is determined by the labour
supply of primary workers and w1 adjusts. Denoting the labour supply of secondary
workers by P2 (as participants) and the employment level by L2, if MPL(P2) > w
then w = MPL(P2) and L2 = P2 and if MPL(P2) < w then the level of employment
is such that MPL(L2) = w. The uniqueness comes from the decreasing return on
each type of labour. Denoting the elasticity of substitution between primary and
secondary workers by ¾ = 1=(1¡¹), the following employment equation for secondary
workers comes out:
L2 = LF2 + LY = (µ=°)
¾:(LM + LF1)
Higher productivity of secondary workers, lower indexation rate and higher partici-
pation of primary workers all increase the level of employment of secondary workers.
10This does not necessarily correspond to a minimum wage: unemployment bene¯ts, non-wage
income, the value of leisure linked to the marginal utility of consumption or e±ciency wage can
generate a °oor on wages depending on the average wage of the economy. The assumption of
relative wage rigidity is appealing, for when the constraint is binding, the wage distribution is
constant, which is a feature of most of Western European economies (Davis 1992 or Blanch°ower
et al. 1993).
12
To solve for the unemployment rates, I make the assumption that young workers and
women in secondary jobs have equal employment probabilities. This is equivalent to:
PF2
PY =
LF2
LY , and therefore the di®erent unemployment rates are:
uM = uF1 = 0 (5)
and
uF2 = uY = 1 ¡ (µ=°)
¾:
1 + q:p
j + (1 ¡ q):p
(6)
The unemployment rate of young workers is a decreasing function of the productivity
of secondary workers, increasing in the indexation coe±cient of minimum wage °,
increasing in the share j of young workers in population, decreasing in the share of
adult women in primary jobs q and increasing in the participation rate of women
p if q is lower than 1=(1 + j). If the share of women in the labour force increases
too quickly relative to their share in good jobs, they will compete with young workers
and the unemployment will increase. Note that the unemployment rates of women
and young workers only di®er by the factor 1 ¡ q; which may be a rationale for
fact 1, i.e. the high correlation of these unemployment rates across countries. The
unemployment rates of all males and females workers (including the young workers)
are : utM =
j
1+j :uY and u
t
F =
(1¡q)p+j
p+j :uY and the unemployment rate of old workers
is uo = p1+p :(1 ¡ q):uY : Finally, the total unemployment rate can be written:
u =
p:(1 ¡ q) + 2:j
1 + p + 2:j
:uY (7)
and it is easy to check that these unemployment rates are always increasing in (1¡q),
j and in pwhen q is small enough11.
Finally, there is also a link between the growth rate of the labour force and
unemployment, through the share of young workers. If the cohorts of young workers
are growing at rate nt, i.e. LY = (1 + nt): (2:LM), then j the ratio of young to old
male workers is equal to:
jt = 2:(1 + nt) (8)
11To prove the last point, note that in utM , u
t
F and u, the derivative with of the constant before
uY respect to p is 0, ¡j:q and ¡2j:q + (1 ¡ q) respectively, i.e. its contribution to lower total
unemployment becomes negligible with lower qwhereas uY is increasing in p as proved in the text.
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2.3 Endogeneity of labour supply
From a macroeconomic perspective, the increase in the level of female labour supply
is usually considered as exogeneous, or at least not so dependent on the rise in
real wages (the income e®ect and the price e®ect tend to compensate each other,
especially given the husband's wage)12. However, a fairly strong endogeneity of
participation with respect to unemployment will be found in the empirical sections 3
and 4. This is easy to understand why; in some age-education cells of the labour force,
female unemployment can reach 40 to 50%, clearly a®ecting the arbitrage between
activity and inactivity through discouragement e®ects. The choice of occupations
also depends on labour market conditions.
For these reasons, participation in the labour force is modelled as follows. The
participation of adult men is inelastic and in the primary segment. For young workers,
it is inelastic and in the secondary segment. For prime-age women, there is a random
disutility of work in the secondary segment ¸i which is distributed in the population
with cumulative distribution function F (:). The disutility of work in the primary
segment is larger (stronger commitment, overtime), and to simplify, I assume that it
is ¸i=± with ± smaller than 1. With these assumptions, there are two cut-o® levels of
disutility: ±:w1 and (1¡uF2):w2 which is higher than ±:w1 for a small enough ±: Women
with a smaller disutility than ±:w1 participate in the primary segment, women with
disutility larger than (1¡uF2):w2 do not participate, the remaining women participate
in the secondary segment. It follows that participation p = F [(1 ¡ uF2):w2] and
the share of women in the good segment is q = F (±:w1)=F [(1 ¡ uF2):w2]. Since
the increase in participation can be seen as supply driven, it will be modelled as a
decrease in the average disutility of participation. To simplify, I assume that the
disutility is uniformly distributed between 0 and ¸ > (1 ¡ uF2):w2: Then
q =
±:w1
(1 ¡ uF2):w2
(9)
and
p =
1
¸
(1 ¡ uF2):w2 (10)
Equation (9) indicates that the "quality" of female participation will begin to increase
when the inequality between the two segments increases. Equation (10) indicates that
12See Layard et al. (1979), Mincer (1962, 1966, 1985), or Shultz (1981) for instance.
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the level of participation increases both on the rise in real wages and on the inverse
of the disutility of leisure: a decrease in ¸ will increase p. It will leave q unchanged at
constant relative wages and unemployment. However, when p rises, so does the ratio
w1
(1¡uF2):w2
, both in the °exible and in the non-°exible economy, and so does q.13
2.4 Conclusion of the model
A simulation of the model is reported in appendix C. Some of its predictions will
be tested. First, in time-series, there should be a long-run relationship between
participation and unemployment. Second, in the cross-section of OECD countries,
the relationship between participation and unemployment involves di®erences across
countries ¯rst in the degree of equality between gender (how far from 1 is q), second
in the degree of downward wage rigidity preventing the equilibrium in this simple
framework, and third, in the participation rate of men. Third, there is a also rela-
tionship between the growth rate of the labour force and unemployment.
3 A cross-sectional analysis
3.1 The empirical strategy
Three preliminary remarks are required before testing the link between labour supply
and unemployment in a cross-section of countries. First, as stated in the model, the
correct participation indicator is not the level but rather the composition of the
labour force. The share of young workers or of women in the labour force will be
a better conditioning variable than levels of participation, since it re°ects the share
of workers in the secondary segment. Second, given that countries with high female
participation are countries with a large number of women in part-time employment,
a control for part-time work is necessary to analyse the e®ect of the hours supplied.
As explanatory variables, I will use the share of hours supplied by women in the
13Equation (9) can easily be extended to gender discrimination; if women are discriminated against
men and receive lower wages, they will participate less in good occupations, since q is proportional to
the wage received. Note that ± can be interpreted either as the fraction of male wages paid to
women, or as any disutility exerted by colleagues. Similarly, in the secondary segment, if women are
discriminated (they face higher unemployment or a lower wage w2), they participate less, according
to (10).
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labour force. 14
Third, the endogeneity of female participation to unemployment possibly leads to
a downwards bias in the estimation of the coe±cient of the impact of participation
on unemployment. The same is true for young workers. The problem of simultaneity
of participation to unemployment can be described by the following equations:
u = C + ¯:(Female Share) + ¸:(Youth Share) + °:X + ²1 (11)
Female Share = C
0
+ ¯
0
:u + °
0
:Z1 + ²2 (12)
Youth Share = C
00
+ ¯
00
:u + °
00
:Z2 + ²3 (13)
where X,Z1 and Z2 are a set of national variables described below, and u is un-
employment. Since ¯0 is likely to be negative and ¯ to be positive, the variable
representing female participation will be correlated with ²1 and the estimation of ¯
by the ordinary least square will be biased downwards. 15.
Finally, some of the variables involved in equation (7) are di±cult to observe.
This is particularly the case with gender inequality in occupations as re°ected by
1¡q or in participation as re°ected by ¸. The relative wage rigidity ° is also di±cult
to observe. Lacking good control variables, I have chosen to concentrate on the
links between labour supply and unemployment with a control for aggregate real
wages when possible, here the Calmfors and Dri±ll's (1988) index of centralization
of bargaining. Other tests using the Jackman et al. dataset with more structural
variables provide the same kind of results.
3.2 The centralization of wage-bargaining as control variables
The variables used by Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) are described in appendix B. The
endogeneous variables, unemployment rates, are expressed in % of the labour force
and averaged over 1980-94. The ¯rst task is to ¯nd appropriate instruments for fe-
male participation among the following: net pre-schooling enrolment of the six year
14It was not possible to ¯nd data on the average number of hours worked by full-time and part-
time workers in all countries. The available data indicated, however, that assuming aggregate
half-time to be part-time was a fairly accurate assumption. So I used the the formula: Female
Share(corr)= LF (1¡part timeF =2)LF+M (1¡part timeF+M=2)where L is the labour force and part time represents the
share of part-time workers (assumed to be half-time) of total employment.
15To improve the estimation, I replace (12) by : Female Share= C
0
+¯
10
:uM +¯
20
:uF +°
0
:Z1+²2
but without any very signi¯cant di®erence.
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old children, schooling expectancy of ¯ve year old children (source Education at a
Glance, OECD), an index of human development corrected by gender inequality, an
index of gender empowerment measures, the share of women in the population en-
roled in tertiary education (sources Report on Human Development, United Nations
1996), birth rates, divorce rates (source UN Demographic Yearbook, 1992), and the
fraction of women in national parliaments (see table A in the appendix).16 The ¯rst
four instruments are eliminated by lack of signi¯cance through a recursive method
(rotations of the variables four by four in a regression of female participation also
including unemployment).17 For the share of young workers, I use the projections of
the 1990 ¯gures made in 1980 by the International Labour O±ce (ILO 1980), which
are based on participation and demographic projections, but not on unemployment
changes, and take the average of the 1980 and 1990 ¯gures. This method should
remove much of the endogeneity problem associated with this variable.18
Tables 3, 4a and b summarize the results. In table 3, I ¯rst perform the simple
OLS estimation with the share of women in the labour force corrected by part-
time (columns 1 and 5). The impact of the share of women is slightly negative
but not signi¯cant, but it becomes positive when the share of young workers is
added to the speci¯cation (column 5). Accounting for endogeneity leads to signi¯cant
changes in the estimates. Columns 2 and 6 are the result of the estimation with a
partial-information method (2-stage least square). I then proceed to full-information
methods (3SLS) which are usually considered as more powerful (columns 3 and 7) and
to GMM methods (columns 4 and 8) where the moment condition is EZ0:² = 0; i.e.
the exogeneity of the instruments: After controlling for endogeneity, the coe±cient of
16Instruments based on policies a®ecting female participation (nurseries, taxation) were not con-
sidered due to endogeneity; it is highly plausible that the government's attitude towards female
participation is in°uenced by the labour market variables.
17Table 5 reports the regressions of the share of women on instruments and on unemployment.
The coe±cients have the expected signs: male unemployment increases female participation while
female unemployment decreases it, higher birth rates, smaller enrolment rates in tertiary education
and smaller divorce rates are also associated with lower participation. The only counter-intuitive
coe±cient is the one of the share of women in parliament. When running the same regression with
the share of women not-corrected by part-time (second column in table 5), the coe±cent is no longer
positive. It might be that the share of women in parliaments has some impact on legislations about
part-time work, which would explain the di®erence.
18The same results were obtained using the predicted share of young workers for 1985.
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female participation becomes signi¯cant at the 10% level in most of the cases, and at
the 5% level with the GMM method. This coe±cient, about 0.5 should be interpreted
as follows. Everything else controlled for, an increase of 8% in the share of hours
supplied by women (approximately the increase faced by the OECD countries since
the mid-70's), is associated in cross-country with an increase of total unemployment
rate of 4% of the labour force. Finally, in all estimates, the share of young workers is
positive and rather signi¯cant, although it reduces the coe±cient of women's share
once introduced.
The same methodology (2SLS, 3SLS and GMM) is then applied to female and
male unemployment rates, as illustrated in tables 4a and 4b. The elasticity is found to
be lower for men (0.43 on average for men, 0.62 on average for women), which is what
the model predicts. These elasticities imply that a 8% increase in the share of women
in the labour force increases unemployment for men by about 3% of the labour force,
and for women by about 5% of the labour force. The impact of the relative supply of
young workers is also stronger for female workers, which is once more consistent with
the model. It should also be observed that the coe±cients of CORP and CORPSQ
are fairly stable, which ex-post justi¯es their use, although the results do not depend
on their inclusion. These regressions must be interpreted carefully, since the choice of
instruments is always di±cult and arbitrary. However, usual tests of their validity do
not reject their exogeneity.19 A Sargan-test for testing over-identifying restrictions
in the non-weighted 2SLS gives 0.974, whereas Â2[3] critical's value at 5% is 7.8220.
Unemployment bene¯ts which have been so far ignored, could jointly a®ect the
level of female participation (by increasing the value of participation), and of unem-
ployment (by reducing search intensity). The previous 3SLS and GMM estimates
were thus re-estimated by adding the replacement ratio (unemployment bene¯ts over
wages) (source Layard et al. 1991, pp51-53). The coe±cients of the share of female
hours in the labour force in total, male and female unemployment with (resp. with-
out) the share of young workers are reported in table 7a (resp. 7b). In addition, all
speci¯cations contain the variables CORP and CORPSQ. It can be observed that
the size of the coe±cients is not a®ected by the introduction of bene¯ts variables, but
the signi¯cance of the coe±cient decreases for women. Overall, it can be concluded
19See the table 6 for these tests.
20e.g. see Greene (1993) pp617-620.
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that unemployment bene¯ts only change the results marginally. 21
The female participation variables can also be interacted with the CORP and
CORPSQ variables: some regressions of this kind indicate an inverted-U dependence
of the coe±cient ¯ in equation (11), with lower signi¯cance levels. These regressions
are not reported here however, since in the model, the coe±cient ¯ varies with the
index of relative wage rigidity, whereas the Calmfors-Dri±ll's index represents a con-
trol for absolute wage rigidity. Another reason is that estimating this more complex
model decreases the number of degrees of freedom.22
The results of this section do not only rely on the instruments. In fact, I will
next report simpler OLS regressions of unemployment on growth rates of the labour
force. However, this is no longer a test of the long-run impact of labour supply,
but instead a test of the short term impact of labour supply. The rationale for
this speci¯cation comes from the combination of equations (8) and (7). The model
of aggregate unemployment is once again estimated with the variables CORP and
CORPSQ and with the growth rate of the labour force over the period 1980-94.
As is shown in table 8, the labour force growth does not account for higher cross-
country unemployment, since the correlation is negative. When a disaggregation by
gender is introduced, the situation changes drastically. As predicted in the model,
the coe±cient on the growth rate of female labour force is positive and signi¯cant,
while the growth rate of the male labour force becomes signi¯cant but comes with a
negative sign. The same remains true when the growth rate of the young workers in
the labour force is added (either the 16-29 or the 16-34 years old, the former although
not being reported here giving similar results). Disaggregation of unemployment by
gender leads to similar conclusions. It is, however, disappointing to see that the e®ect
of the growth of the labour force of younger workers is stronger for male than for
female unemployment, contrary to the regressions in level shown in tables 3-4.
There is of course a question of endogeneity with those growth rates. Concerning
the growth rate of the labour supply of younger workers, the criticism does not
apply since the ¯gures in 1990 are the projection data from the ILO (1980), based
on changes in the population structure and on trends in participation, but not on
unemployment trends. The growth rate of the labour supply of male workers arguably
21Similar conclusion is also reached when controlling for the duration of unemployment bene¯ts.
22These regressions are available upon request.
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depends on education and retirement decisions, which are certainly highly dependent
on aggregate unemployment and the negative coe±cient in the regression is probably
due to endogeneity. However, it is very di±cult to ¯nd good instruments for the
male labour force23. Finally, the endogeneity of the growth rate of female labour
supply is certainly important, but tends to downwards bias the estimates: these
regressions underestimate the extent to which female participation growth a®ected
unemployment.
This is suggestive evidence. One would like to carry out several more cross-
sectional regressions, for instance extend the analysis to other periods. Regressions
of the average unemployment over the period 1970-80 were less successful: some
countries had to be removed from the sample because of data availability. Moreover,
the series are not always consistent between the 70's and the 80's, as explained in
appendix A. Extending the analysis to more cross-sectional units, like the regions
of the countries, would have created new problems, since the labour force is mobile
between regions. Thus the problem of endogeneity of regional participation would
have been extremely di±cult to overcome. Finally, time-series of instruments such
as the one used above were not available.
4 Some time-series evidence
There is, however, another empirical strategy for overcoming endogeneity problems
with time-series methods. I investigate co-integration and non-Granger causality. It
allows me to measure the permanent e®ect on unemployment of an increase in labour
supply . Longer time series are required, and I use quarterly data of the labour force
from di®erent sources (see appendix A for a description) for France, Germany, the
USA and the UK, since 1967 (1972 for the UK). The number of observations is 82 for
the UK, 103 for France and the US and 100 for Germany. Seasonality is removed by
projection on quarterly intercepts. No disaggregation by gender is available for these
countries with quarterly data, and therefore I test the model in a rather unfavourable
case. Since the changes in the level of the labour supply over the period 1970-1995
23The most obvious one, the growth rate of the male working age population, was found to be
almost non-correlated in both cross-country and time-series with the growth rate of the male labour
force (a correlation coe±cient of merely 0.12). This is because in some countries like the US, both
growth rates are very high, whereas in most European countries, the working age population is
increasing quickly, while the male labour force is constant or even declining.
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are purely re°ecting its compositional changes, the coe±cients linking the level of
participation and unemployment should be interpreted as a reduced form of the
coe±cients implying the composition of participation and unemployment.
4.1 Co-integration
First, I investigate the existence of a co-integration relationship between unemploy-
ment and the labour force. In the following, the variables (the unemployment rate
and the participation rate) are in logarithm. With usual unit root tests24, the non-
stationarity of participation cannot be rejected in most of the cases (table 9). The
non-stationarity of unemployment is sometimes rejected for the UK, but evidence
rather suggests non-stationarity, especially for France (see table 10).
The non-stationarity of participation and unemployment implies that these can-
not be linked by more than one co-integration relation. Computing the ADF test of
the residuals of the regression:
Log(U) = C + a:Log(PART ) + ² (14)
and testing for stationarity (which implies co-integration), it appears that in three
of the four countries, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the series unemploy-
ment and participation are not co-integrated at 5% or 10% at least in one of the
speci¯cations (table 11). In table 12, I also provide the results of alternative tests
of co-integration, known as the Johansen tests25. Except for France, the Johansen
test rejects the null hypothesis of no co-integration less often than with the previ-
ous two-stages procedure. However, the likelihood ratio associated with the highest
eigenvalue is often close to the critical value of the 5% con¯dence level (equal to 15.4),
except for the USA. More generally, it seems that the existence of a high minimum
wage in France implies a strong relation between the two series which is consistent
with the model.
24Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, or the signi¯cance of the coe±cient ° in ¢Xt = C +
k¡1P
s=1
®:¢Xt¡s + °:Xt¡k + ²t + ±:trend with or without a trend
25The test uses the autoregressive decomposition of X = (Log(U); Log(PART )): ¢Xt =
k¡1P
i=1
Di:¢Xt¡i+¼:Xt¡k+²t where ²t is stationary, Di is the coe±cients of the polynomial matrix of
the lag operator and a matrix. The Johansen test consists of ¯nding the rank of the matrix ¼ which
directly gives the order of co-integration. In the bivariate case, this is a test of the null hypothesis
fthe highest eigenvalue of ¼ is equal to 0g, equivalent to absence of co-integration relation.
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Given the coe±cients of the long-run relation between the series (reported in
table 13), one can calculate the estimated e®ect of the increase in the labour force
between 1971 and 1991 (table 14). The rise of unemployment observed in these four
countries is therefore well explained by the model: the ¯tted rise in unemployment
(the elasticity times the rise in participation) is between 50% and 200% of the actual
value.26
4.2 Causality
From Granger (1986), reported in Hendry (1995, p289,d), when two series are co-
integrated, at least one must Granger-cause the other. I investigate the direction
of causality and perform causality tests of the null hypothesis: X does not Granger-
cause Y. In table 15, the non-causality from unemployment to participation is rejected
for the USA, France and Germany (with a six-month lag in Germany). The non-
causality from participation to unemployment is rejected at good levels of con¯dence
for France, evidence is mixed for Germany, and the non-causality cannot be rejected
for the UK and the USA.
4.3 Interpretation of co-integration
The interpretation of co-integration in France is that both series are linked by a
long-run relation, or equivalently that participation has an impact on unemploy-
ment. A second interpretation, though more controversial, is that the source of
non-stationarity in unemployment arises from labour supply shocks and not from
any other shocks. One may be tempted to interpret the robustness of co-integration
in France in this light: the unemployment series are found to be very persistent in
this country. This property is interpreted as a hysteresis phenomenon generated by
insiders bargaining over wages, at a constant labour supply (Blanchard and Sum-
mers 1986). The view here is totally di®erent: the non-stationarity of unemployment
comes from changes in the labour supply. In the same vein, the signi¯cance of trends
in many empirical macroeconomic works (Bean 1993 for instance found in panel data
of OECD countries that the shocks on unemployment were explained as well both by
the world GDP °uctuations and by a trend) could be interpreted as simply proxying
26The dynamic aspects of the link can be explored with structural VARs (see my IIES seminar
paper 629) but no new information is added.
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for the increase in labour force participation.
5 Concluding comments and future research
These evidence suggest the existence of a positive link between the composition of the
labour force and unemployment. This faces an objection: the adverse e®ects of rising
female participation on unemployment might not exist because the female-male wage
gap has decreased and that the increased participation of women would thus rather
be demand driven. However, Mincer's procedure (predicting changes in participation
with changes in wages given estimated elasticities of labour supply to wages) does not
support this conclusion (see Layard et al. 1979, or Mincer 1985). Consistently, the
model proposes a mechanism through which women more often participate due to
changes in the opportunity cost of participation, and in the same time work in better
occupations because of the relative attractiveness of the primary jobs when the share
of female and young workers in the labour force rises. It is also highly plausible that
employers have substituted men for women in some sectors to get around unions:
this is a pure competition story between di®erent factors of production, i.e. men
and women. As an illustration of this, some authors have studied the evolution of
employment by gender in speci¯c sectors like the Printing and Publishing sector and
the replacement of male typesetters by more productive female workers in the 70's
(see for instance Borzeix and Maruani 1988 and the subsequent references of the
work by Maruani). This substitution should obviously weaken the relative position
of unskilled men.
A related objection is that men and women work in di®erent occupations, so
that substitutability (implying competition) between them is unlikely. Once more,
one can argue that there might be a low short-run substitutability, but a higher
substitutability in the long-run (10 to 15 years). In any case, results in Grant and
Hamermesh (1982) on substitutability of production functions cannot be explained
without gender competition. There is also a theoretical answer: even a narrow
sector in which women and men, or more consistently with the model of section
2, women and young workers are employed in the same occupation, like cashiers in
supermarkets is su±cient for an increasing female labour supply to imply a decline in
the equilibrium wage of young workers. This is the case when there is some mobility
across sectors.
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In conclusion, this work pleads in favour of the inclusion of controls for supply
of labour in any unemployment regressions contrary to what is usually done. It also
suggests that a combination of quickly rising female participation and high gender
inequality may have adverse e®ects. Therefore, the policy implication if one wants to
draw some, should be to reduce gender inequality, and not to reduce female partici-
pation. More generally, future work should attempt to investigate the role of gender
discrimination in high European unemployment.
² Appendix A. De¯nitions and data sources, series names.
Yearly Data: OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1962-82, 1970-90, 1973-93, OECD Quar-
terly Labour Force Statistics, 1994-95. Many data breaks are by less than 1%, due to random
errors in labour force surveys. The remaining part is due to profound changes in the mea-
surement concepts, especially during the 70's, a period during which most countries adapted
the ILO de¯nition to unemployment statistics. Generally, the data are self-consistent in the
80's. In the OECD-CEP database, the series are generally chained. Another method to
estimate the amplitude of the break, less ad hoc, is to regress the series on their lagged
values, with a constant, a trend and a dummy for the break (ex: break in 77, the dummy
D1=(time>77) was included) so that the cyclical component, the trend and the average
value of the series are consistent before and after the break. In practice, the di®erence is
very small with the chaining method.
Quarterly Data: USA: Employment and Earnings, UK: Employment Gazette, Ger-
many: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fÄur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik Jahreszahlen,
and OECD, France: OECD (Civilian Employment on Payrolls and Bulletin Mensuel des
Statistiques du Travail. The quarterly data of the 15-64 years old population are interpolated
from the yearly data published in the OECD Labour Force Statistics.
² Appendix B.
Corporatism variables.
Calmfors and Dri±ll (1988) constructed a rank ordering of countries according to the
degree of centralization (1988, p19, table 1), for 17 OECD countries which aims at repre-
senting the e®ect of labour market institutions on (aggregate) wage determination. Rank 1
is for Austria, the most corporatist country and rank 17 for Canada, the most decentralized
economy. Evidence suggests that economic performance is linked to this rank according to
an inverted U-shaped curve. The theoretical argument is that in decentralized economies,
wages (almost) fully adjust to the labour supply, whereas in very centralized economies,
unions take account of the externality of wage bargaining on employment, which is not true
in the "intermediate" economies. The advantage of this approach is that two variables,
the rank ordering and its square, proxy the 6 structural explanatory variables that can be
found in structural models like Layard et al. (1991). It is therefore possible to add new
explanatory variables. The loss obviously lies in the lack of structure of the U-curve, how-
ever, the results will be shown to be robust and reveals the di®erences between men, women
and young workers. I extend the classi¯cation to four other countries: Spain, Portugal,
Luxembourg and Ireland, which were not included in the initial ranking27. To allow for the
27In Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, p 52), these countries are characterized according
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possibility of a U-shaped relationship, we construct the variable CORP , which is directly
the rank ordering of the 17+4=21 countries, and CORPSQ = CORP ¤CORP its square.
Instruments
See table A.
² Appendix C. Simulation of the model in Section 2
This is a simulation28 of a non-°exible economy where the changes are all driven by the
supply factor ¸ (the upper bound of the distribution of disutility of work).
¸ (upper bound of disutility) 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.5 1.5 1.0
Female Participation Rate p 0.30 0.35 0.42 0.54 0.64 0.77 0.99
Female Share in Primary Jobs q 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.43
Total Unemployment Rate (%) 7.3 8.3 9.7 11.3 12.3 13.5 14.9
Male Unemployment Rate (%) 4.7 5.4 6.2 7.2 7.8 8.6 9.4
Female Unemployment Rate (%) 10.8 12.2 13.9 16.0 17.2 18.6 20.2
Youth Unemployment Rate (%) 14.1 16.1 18.5 21.6 23.5 25.7 28.3
Female To Male Wage wf=wm 0.775 0.778 0.782 0.787 0.790 0.795 0.800
When ¸ decreases from 6.0 to 1.5, female participation increases from 30% to 77%.
There are more workers in the secondary segment, leading to a higher unemployment rate for
secondary workers (identical to the youth unemployment rate by construction). The primary
sector becomes more attractive to women, whose share q in this sector increases from 36
to 41%. The unemployment rates of all categories rise twofold. Due to the compositional
change of labour supply, women's relative wages increase during the same period.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rates by gender and age. UM= Male Unemployment, UF=
Female Unemployment, UMO=Adult Male Unemployment, UFO=Adult Female Un-
employment
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Figure 2: UY = Unemployment rate of young (less than 25 year old) workers.
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Figure 3: SHWR = Share of women in the labour force, OECD countries
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Figure 4: Age composition of the labour force, USA vs Europe
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Figure 5: Relative wages in the US (median wage of the groups). WYWO = ratio of
young workers (under 25) wages to older workers (over 25) wages; WYWOF (resp.
M) = WYWO ratio for female (resp. male) workers. WFWM = ratio of female
workers wages to male workers wages. WFWMO (resp. Y) = WFWM ratio for older
workers (resp. young workers).
